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Abstract
Despite mandatory parental leave policies being a prevalent feature of labor markets in
developed countries, their aggregate eects in the economy are not well understood. To
assess their quantitative impact, we develop a general equilibrium model of fertility and labor
market decisions that builds on the labor matching framework of Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994). We nd that females gain substantially with generous policies but this benet occurs
at the expense of a reduction in the welfare of males. Leave policies have important eects on
fertility, leave taking decisions, and employment. These eects are mainly driven by how the
policy aects bargaining { young females anticipate future states with higher threat points
induced by the policy. Because the realization of these states depend on the decisions of
females to give birth and take a leave, leave policies eectively subsidize fertility and leave
taking. We also nd that generous paid parental leaves can be an eective tool to encourage
mothers to spend time with their children after giving birth.
Keywords: Human capital, labor market equilibrium, parental leave policies, fertility, tem-
porary separations.
JEL Classication: E24; E60; J2; J3.
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11 Introduction
Mandated parental leave policies have been widely introduced in developed countries in the
last two decades.1 The channels through which parental leave policies inuence economic
decisions are rather complex and are likely to have diverse eects across heterogeneous groups
of individuals in the economy. Parental leaves entitlements are likely to increase the welfare
of the groups most likely to benet from them. While these individuals may improve their
\bargaining position" with parental leaves, rms are likely to pass the costs of hiring and
training temporary workers to the groups beneting from leaves. To the extent that rms
may not be able to pass all the costs to workers, leave mandates may reduce labor demand
and negatively aect employment of workers not directly aected by the policy. When leaves
are paid and are nanced with government tax revenue, as in most European countries, there
is an important redistribution of resources from taxpayers to mothers on leave.
Empirically, it is dicult to disentangle how these channels aect outcomes. Studies
exploiting the variation of leave taking behavior on household level data face the problem
that the workers taking up leaves are likely to be a non-random selection of workers.2 To
the extent that is dicult to control for all relevant sources of heterogeneity and that the
explanatory variables on the regressions are endogenous variables (labor market experience,
tenure, number of children), the interpretation of empirical ndings is subject to debate.
Some empirical studies have used cross-country data to evaluate how changes in leave enti-
tlements aect the gap between female and male outcomes.3 These studies are also subject
to limitations. First, these studies are likely to overstate the eects of parental leave policies
as some countries have implemented other family policies such as child care at the same time
they expanded the generosity of parental leaves. Second, countries may dier on dimensions
that are dicult to control for in the regressions. Third, estimates are limited by small
sample sizes and incomplete data.4
1These policies specify a minimum amount of leave time that a person is entitled to in order to care for
a newborn child with job dismissal prohibited during pregnancy and a guaranteed job after the leave.
2See for instance, Dalto (1989) and Waldfogel (1997, 1998b).
3See for instance Ruhm and Teague (1997) and Ruhm (1998).
4See the discussion in Ruhm (1998).
2In view of these diculties, we nd it useful to build a benchmark model in order to
improve our understanding of the mechanisms that drive the eects of parental leave poli-
cies. We develop a framework that builds on the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) matching
model in several dimensions. Females make fertility decisions and derive utility from spend-
ing time with children after giving birth. Females may want to temporarily separate from
a job to enjoy the utility value of staying at home without giving up their job-specic hu-
man capital. However, temporary separations are costly for employers. We consider as a
benchmark a situation in which there is no government intervention in the labor market {
rms and workers are free to agree on temporary separations. Moreover, bargaining leads
to ecient outcomes because we assume perfect information on types and we do not impose
any exogenous restriction on bargaining.5 In this framework, parental leave policies aect
equilibrium allocations and welfare through three channels. First, these policies increase the
threat point used in bargaining for females that have the option of taking a parental leave
(bargaining channel). Second, parental leaves reduce the value of posting vacancies which
reduces the job nding rate (general equilibrium channel). Third, paid parental leaves induce
a redistribution of resources from workers {taxpayers{ to mothers on leave (redistributive
channel). In order to explore the quantitative signicance of these channels, we calibrate the
economy without parental leaves to data for the U.S. economy prior to the implementation
of parental leave policies at the federal level in 1993.
Our quantitative analysis leads to three key ndings. First, we nd substantial eects of
parental leave policies on steady-state welfare with these eects being quantitatively more
important for paid leaves and for leaves of longer duration. Females gain substantially with
generous policies but this benet occurs at the expense of a reduction in the welfare of
males. Parental leave policies lead to aggregate steady-state welfare losses because these
policies subsidize inecient matches and encourage too much leave taking by fertile females.
Second, we nd that the change in welfare of females is aected by the general equilibrium,
redistribution, and bargaining channels operating in the model. However, when leaves are
5The assumption of ecient bargaining is adopted not because of its realism but because it oers a useful
benchmark to evaluate the costs and the redistributive eects of parental leave policies.
3paid and of relatively long duration, the welfare eects are mostly driven by the redistribution
channel. Third, parental leave policies have non-trivial eects on fertility, employment, and
the time that mothers spend at home with children. We also compare the eect of parental
leave policies with two other policies that subsidize mothers: a subsidy to working mothers
and a subsidy to staying at home mothers. While parental leave policies induce the strongest
eects on allocations (fertility, employment, and time spent with children), the subsidy to
working mothers leads to the highest welfare gains of females and the smallest welfare losses
for males across the three policies considered.
Our paper is related to a large literature of calibrated models on the economics of the
family.6 Dierently from many papers in this literature, we abstract from marriage issues and
focus instead on labor-market decisions and temporary separations.7 Our paper is closest
to Erosa, et al. (2002). A critical distinction is that we allow for temporary separations
between a worker and a job which is essential in capturing the economics of leave policies.
Moreover, we model the demand side of the labor market to capture the general equilibrium
eects induced by mandatory leave policies.8
The analysis proceeds as follows. In the next section, we present a model with volun-
tary leaves, calibrate it to U.S. data, and evaluate its main properties. Section 3 extends
the analysis to mandatory leaves and performs experiments to understand the quantitative
importance of bargaining, general equilibrium and redistributive channels. We also compare
mandated leaves with other policies that subsidize mothers. We conclude in section 4.
2 A Model with Voluntary Leaves
The economy is populated by a large number of workers that face exponential life { in
every period there is a constant probability  of dying. We assume that there is an equal
6For instance Aiyagari, et al. (2000), Regalia and R os-Rull (1999), Fern andez and Rogerson (2001),
Caucutt, et al. (2002), Da-Rocha and Fuster (2006), among many others.
7There is some evidence that marital status does not change child penalties in wages for women while it
generates a large premium in wages for men, Phipps, et al. (2001).
8Our paper is also closely related to Bernal and Fruttero (2007) who evaluate the role of leave policies on
parental investment in children. They nd that mandated unpaid leaves have negligible eects on the time
mothers spend with children but paid leaves substantially increase investment time in children.
4proportion of males and females. We model ex-ante heterogeneity across individuals to
study the distributional eects of mandated leaves across education groups. Females face
a constant probability  of becoming non-fertile every period. People derive utility from
consumption. In addition, females also derive utility from the number of children they have
and from time spent with them. The instantaneous utility function is linear in consumption
of goods and time spent with children, and concave with respect to the number of children.
There is a continuum of entrepreneurs that can create production opportunities without
a cost. Entrepreneurs have linear preferences over consumption and post vacancies to search
for workers. Posting a vacancy requires c units of the output good every period. If a worker-
vacancy pair is matched, then the following period the production unit can produce, be on
leave, or be destroyed. A matched vacancy that is not destroyed faces a xed cost of C
units of output per period whether the unit is producing or not. A production opportunity
requires one worker.
2.1 The Problem of a Fertile Female
We use the dynamic programming language to describe the decision problem of fertile fe-
males. Fertile females make a fertility decision, a labor-market decision, and are subject to
fertility and human capital shocks. The timing of decisions and shocks are represented in
the diagram below. Each period is divided in a fertility stage, a labor stage, and a matching
stage.
Fertility Stage Fertile females start the period with a given 4-tuple (j;d;h;n) indicating
job status j 2 fe;ug (whether they are matched to a job or not), domestic status d 2 f0;1g
(indicating whether they can enjoy the value of staying at home with children or not), human
capital h, and number of children n. Their discounted lifetime expected value function is
given by W
f
j (d;h;n): At the beginning of the fertility stage, fertile females draw two shocks:
A stochastic fertility opportunity and a realization of the value of staying at home with
children: We assume that a fertile female draws a fertility opportunity with probability .
We let  depend on the number of children a fertile female has at the beginning of the
5period and will be calibrated to match data on the distribution of children across women.
The utility value of spending time with children  is drawn from a continuous and time-
invariant distribution F(), where F is assumed to be the cdf of a normal distribution with
mean  and variance 2
: Children are costly in terms of time and goods.9 Each child reduces
female labor supply (e.g., hours worked) in  units while working and costs   units of goods
per period. These costs are incurred while the mother is fertile so when a female becomes
non-fertile her children become adults and thus are no longer costly. These features imply
that given a fertility opportunity, a fertile female assesses the benets of having a newborn
child (the utility ow and the option value of spending time with them) against the direct
and indirect costs. Since females face exponential life, the expected cost of children are the
















The value of a fertile female before the realizations of the fertility opportunity and the
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j is the value of a fertile female at the beginning of the labor market stage and the
max operator represents the decision of whether to give birth to the (n+1)-th child or not, a
decision that can only be made if the female draws a fertility opportunity. When the female
9Modeling the time and goods cost of children allows the model to deliver fertility rates that vary by
female types. This turns out to be important for matching fertility rates by education in the data.
6gives birth to a child, her domestic status is set to d1 (or d = 1); which indicates that she can
enjoy the current realization of  if she decides to stay at home in the labor stage. In this
case, moreover, the female will start the next period with d0 = 1 so that she can still enjoy
the value of staying at home with children. If the female works during the current period d0
is set to 0; indicating that next period she will not be able to enjoy the value of staying at
home with children (unless she gives birth to another child). This assumption ensures that
all employment separations to enjoy the value of  (whether temporary or permanent) start
with the birth of a child.
Labor Stage A fertile female that is currently matched to a job (j = e) decides whether
to accept (A), to reject (R), or to be on leave (L). We assume that production takes place
at the Labor Stage. We represent the labor-market decision problem as,
V
f








The value of accepting a job A is given by,
A
f(d;h;n;) = w
f(d;h;n;)    n +  log(1 + n) (2)







































The rst term wf(d;h;n;) represents the labor market earnings of a fertile female in state
(d;h;n;). We assume that wages are determined by Generalized Nash Bargaining. In
equilibrium, wages depend on the worker's human capital and number of children as they
both aect the output of the job match. We allow for the possibility that when d = 1 wages
depend on the value of staying at home : This assumption allows for ecient separations
after a childbirth: When the decision to work maximizes the surplus of the match, a female
7with domestic status d1 may be induced to work with a wage rate that compensates her for
not enjoying the value of staying at home with children. When d = 0 the worker cannot enjoy
the value of staying at home, so that the realization of this value does not aect wages.10
The terms  n and  log(1 + n) in equation (2) represent the goods costs and the utility
ow of having n children during the current period. The other terms in equation (2) denote
the expected discounted future utility where the superscript f (n) in the value function W
indicates whether the female is fertile (non-fertile) and the subscript e (u) indicates whether
the female is matched (unmatched) to a job. The inter-temporal discount factor is b  and
the eective discount factor is  = b (1   ), where (1   ) is the survival probability.
A fertile female is subject to many shocks at the end of the labor market stage. She can
become non-fertile with probability , be exogenously separated from her job with probability
; and her human capital evolves according to a rst-order Markov process. If the female
remains fertile and her job match is not destroyed, an event with probability (1  )(1 );
her future discounted value is given by the function W f
e and her human capital evolves
according to a
hh0: With probability (1 ) the female remains fertile and her job match is
destroyed and, in this event, her future value is given by W f
u and her human capital evolves
according to r
hh0: With probability  the female becomes non-fertile. In this case, her future
utility is W n
e if she remains matched to the job and W n
u if she becomes unmatched.
The value of rejecting a job oer R is given by,
R































If a female stays at home, she receives the utility d, but her labor income is zero. Note that
10Notice that if a female has given birth to n children, there are at most n periods in which her wage rate
could have been aected by the realization of the home value v: This is because the domestic status is set
to d = 0 when the female works.
8the value of staying at home  is enjoyed only if d = 1: Moreover, d0 = d so that she can enjoy
the value of staying at home for more than one period. Conditional on being alive, there is
a probability p of receiving a job oer next period, a probability  of becoming non-fertile,
and human capital evolves according to r.




f(d;h;n;) + d    n +  log(1 + n) (4)







































The rst term represents the wage when the female is on leave. This wage is negotiated
through bargaining and can be negative since the rm and the worker may share the cost of
maintaining the match to preserve specic human capital. When on leave, a fertile female
receives utility from staying at home with children d and utility from having children. Con-
ditional on the match not being exogenously destroyed, and contrary to when a fertile female
is not employed, she receives in the following period an employment oer with probability
1, and human capital evolves according to l
hh0 instead of r
hh0.
An unmatched fertile female (j = u) does not make any decisions in the Labor Stage.
Her value coincides with that of a fertile female who rejects a job oer V f
u (d;h;n;) =
Rf(d;h;n;).
Matching Stage New matches are formed at the end of the period (Matching Stage). In
particular, matches between vacancies and workers are formed according to the following
exogenous matching technology: M(u;v) = kuv1  with  2 (0;1) and k > 0 where u is
the mass of non-employed workers, v is the mass of vacancies posted, and M(u;v) is the
number (mass) of matches formed. The probability that a non-employed worker nds a job
is denoted by p =
M(u;v)
u . The probability that a rm matches a vacancy with a worker
9is q =
M(u;v)
v . As previously discussed, matches are subject to an exogenous destruction
probability  every period.
2.2 The Problems of Non-Fertile Females and Males
We assume that when a fertile female becomes non-fertile, her children become adults and
leave home. Upon becoming non-fertile, a female does not derive utility from spending
time at home with children and her children are no longer costly in terms of goods or time.
Therefore, at the beginning of the period, the state of a non-fertile female includes job status,
human capital, and number of children (as she derives utility  log(1+n) from the number of
children). Non-fertile females only make labor-market decisions. A non-fertile female with
a job considers whether to accept or reject it. It is straightforward to show that in this
environment leaves are never optimal for non-fertile females. Therefore, the value of an oer
for a non-fertile female is the maximum of two options,
V
n
e (h;n) = maxfA
n(h;n);R
n(h;n)g; (5)
where the value of accepting and rejecting are simpler versions of the values for fertile females.
A non-fertile female without a job does not make any decision and, therefore, the value of
being unmatched (u) is the same as the value of rejecting V n
u (h;n) = Rn(h;n).
Males at the beginning of the period have as state variables job status j 2 fe;ug and
human capital h: The problem of a male is similar to that faced by a non-fertile female with
no children.
2.3 The Value of a Job for the Entrepreneur
We assume that output is produced at the Labor Stage (e.g. before the realization of the job
destruction shock  and new matches are formed). We assume that the mapping between
human capital and output is dierent for men and women. The output in a match, net of
production costs C, with a fertile female f that has human capital h and n children is given
10by
y
f(h;n) = (1   !g)(1   !f n)(1   n)h   C;
where labor productivity of a female is !g points lower than that of a male with the same
human capital and each child reduces the labor productivity of mothers by !f points and
working hours by . Children do not aect the labor productivity and hours of work of
non-fertile females. The output produced by a non-fertile female with human capital h
satises
y
n(h) = (1   !g)h   C:
We introduce the possibility of exogenous productivity dierences across gender and family
status (!g;!f) since the distribution of wages across these types is crucial for fertility and
labor-market decisions and the model abstracts from features that might be important in
accounting for gender and family wage dierences, such as mothers exerting less eort in
accumulating human capital when working, discrimination in hiring, promotion, and the
allocation of rm-provided training.11 In the calibration, exogenous productivity dierences
are chosen so that the model generates gender and family wage gaps similar to the ones
observed in the U.S. economy.
The value of a job with a fertile female is the maximum between the value of producing,











11Wages of mothers relative to wages of non-mothers and men will determine the tax rate needed to nance
parental leave policies studied in the computational experiments in Section 3 of the paper.














































where yf(h;n) denotes the output {net of the cost of maintaining a job C{ produced in a job
match with a fertile female with human capital h and number of children n: The expected
value of a job next period depends on the realization of the human capital shock (h0); on
whether the female remains fertile or not, and on the number of children in the next period.
The number of children next period is a random variable whose distribution depends on
the realizations of shocks for fertility opportunities, value of staying at home, and human
capital. To forecast this distribution, we use the policy function be(d0;h0;n;0) describing
the decision to give birth.12
The value of a job temporarily on leave is
J
f
l (d;h;n;) =  C   w
f
l (d;h;n;) (8)








































where C is the cost of maintaining the job and w
f
l is the wage when the female is on leave.
12Since the female has worked during the current period, her domestic status at the Labor Stage next
period is d0. Moreover, since the job match has not been destroyed, the policy function is evaluated at the
job status e, which is indicated by the subscript e in the policy function.
12The value of a job next period depends on fertility, demographic, and human capital shocks.
Again, the policy function for birth decisions is used to forecast the probability distribution
of the number of children during the next period.
The values of a job with a non-fertile female and a job with a male are simpler versions
of the value functions described above.
2.4 Wage Determination
The decisions of rms and workers regarding whether to accept, to be on leave, or to break














where i 2 fm;f;ng denotes the demographic type of worker (male, fertile female, and non-
fertile female) and s is the state of each type depending on whose problem we are considering.
If the rm and the worker decide not to break the match, then the wage is determined by
a generalized Nash bargaining process. In particular, the wage rate is such that the value
for the worker is the value of the outside alternative plus a proportion " of the surplus, and
similarly for the entrepreneur with a share of 1   " of the surplus. The wage rates of an
















l(s)   0]: (10)
Note that the outside opportunity for the individual with an oer is the value of rejecting
the job. Similarly, the outside opportunity for the rm is given by the value of posting a
new vacancy, which is zero in equilibrium.
We assume that all workers search in a common labor market so that they have the
same job nding rate.13 Moreover, the probability that a vacancy is matched with a worker
13This assumption is made to simplify the computation of equilibrium. Our quantitative ndings suggest
13of a given type (gender, human capital, and the fertility status and number of children
of female workers) is given by the equilibrium distribution of types across non-employed
workers. In equilibrium, the vacancy to non-employment ratio is such that the expected
value of a vacancy is zero.
2.5 Calibration
The Family and Medical Leave Act (F.M.L.A.) instituting three months of unpaid maternity
leave was approved by the U.S. Congress in 1993. We thus calibrate the benchmark economy
(an economy with voluntary leaves) to U.S. data prior to 1993.14 Whenever possible, we use
data for 1988 that are less likely to be aected by changes in behavior due to the expectation
of the passage of the F.M.L.A.15 The objective of the calibration procedure is to make the
equilibrium of the model with voluntary leaves consistent with observations relevant for the
purpose of our research question { employment levels of males and females, human-capital
accumulation, wage dierences, and fertility rates. The calibration procedure has two main
components. First, a set of parameter values are selected using a-priori information. Second,
the remaining parameter values are selected so that the equilibrium of the model generates
statistics that match data targets. We next describe in detail these steps.
2.5.1 Parameter Values Selected without Solving the Model
The length of the model period is inversely related to the computational cost of the model.
Since the calibration exercise involves nding a large number of parameter values to match
data targets, choosing the length of the period is a non-trivial issue. We choose a model
period of one quarter because it is the longest period that allows us to study the mandated
that modeling a separate labor market for each education type is not likely to have important consequences
for the results that we focus on, as mandatory leaves policies have a small impact on the decision of rms
to post vacancies.
14Waldfogel (1998a) documents that about 50% of females had some maternity leave coverage before 1993.
We think, however, that most of these leaves can be understood as voluntary contracts between rms and
workers.
15The Pregnancy Discrimination Act was approved in 1978 and the benchmark model does not allow for
discrimination { vacancies are posted in a single market with random matching.
14leave policies instituted by the F.M.L.A. in the U.S. of one quarter. The time preference
parameter b  is selected to match an annual interest rate of 4%. The probability of dying
in a period  is selected to reproduce a working-life expectancy of 45 years. Similarly,
the probability of becoming non-fertile is selected to reproduce an expected fertile life of
20 years.16 We set the time cost per child  to 10 percent as suggested by the empirical
estimates (see Angrist and Evans, 1998 and the references therein).
Human capital depends on three factors: (a) formal education, which is xed through
the individual's life; (b) general experience, which accumulates with time working; and (c)
specic tenure, which accumulates with time working within a job. The human capital of
an individual with education jE; experience jG, and tenure jS is
h(jE;jG;jS) = hE(jE)  hG(jG)  hS(jS);
where (hE;hG;hS) is a triple of vectors describing how wages grow with education, experi-
ence, and tenure. We assume three educational types: high school or less jE = 1, college
dropouts and associate degrees jE = 2, and complete college or more jE = 3. The distribu-
tion of the adult population across these types is restricted to U.S. Census data from Bachu
and O'Connell (2000). The human capital of the rst educational type with no experience
and no tenure is normalized to 1, hence h(1;1;1) = hE(1)  hG(1)  hS(1) = 1: The human
capital of the other two educational types hE(2) and hE(3) are xed so that the average wage
of males in these two educational categories relative to the least educated males is consistent
with wage dierentials across these groups in the data.17
We use estimates from Topel (1991) in order to select values for how wages grow with
general experience and specic human capital (hG;hS). Since the vectors hG and hS do
not vary with the gender or education of individuals, we have assumed that human capital
increases with experience and tenure at the same rate for all individuals in the economy. For
16For non-fertile, the probability of dying is adjusted to generate an expected life after becoming non-fertile
of 25 years.
17Relative human capital does not correspond entirely with relative wages because of dierences in tenure
and experience across education types, but it represents a close approximation.
15ease of computation, experience and tenure are measured in years and are restricted to take
values in the set f0;1;:::;10g.18 Since the model period is set to a quarter, we assume that
when an individual works during the current period both experience and tenure increase by a
year with probability 1/4 and that they remain constant with probability 3/4.19 We assume
that during all work interruptions (reject or leave) experience remains constant. During a
temporary leave, we assume that specic human capital remains constant with probability 1.
During a permanent separation (reject or exogenous job destruction), all the specic human
capital accumulated on the job is destroyed (jS is set to 1 and hS(1) = 1).20 The probability
distributions (a;l;r) in the Bellman equations above are set to be consistent with the
evolution on human capital just described.21
Following Blanchard and Diamond (1989) we assume a constant returns-to-scale matching
technology, M(u;v) = kuv1 . These authors estimate  = 0:4 using monthly U.S. data.
According to van Ours and Ridders (1992), the average duration of a vacancy in the U.S.
economy is 45 days. Following Andolfatto (1996), we use this statistic to compute the




90 = 0:8677: The
Economic Report of the President indicates that the average duration of unemployment is
12 weeks, which implies a probability of being matched in a day of 1/84, and therefore




90 = 0:6597: Using these targets for p and q, the equations dening these
two probabilities, and the value  = 0:4, we obtain u
v = 1:3153 and k = 0:7776.
The bargaining power of workers " plays a key role in determining hiring costs. We
18The vector of general human capital hG describes wage growth as experience varies between 0 to 10 years
and is given by 1.00, 1.0697, 1.1356, 1.1973, 1.2544, 1.3070, 1.3551, 1.3992, 1.4396, 1.4773, 1.5130, 1.5478,
1.5830, 1.6198, 1.6597, 1.7045, 1.7561, 1.8166, 1.8887, 1.9756, 2.0809; and the vector of specic human capital
hS describes wage growth as tenure varies between 0 to 10 years and is given by 1.00, 1.0514, 1.0964, 1.1354,
1.1685, 1.1963, 1.2194, 1.2385, 1.2543, 1.2675, 1.2788. These values are such that an average worker in the
model has an experience and tenure prole of wages similar to those estimated by Topel (1991).
19We make human capital evolve stochastically for computational reasons. Since human capital is a state
variable in the decision problems and we consider a quarterly period, this assumption substantially saves on
grid size and as a result on computational costs. Note that since the model features risk-neutral workers and
entrepreneurs, this assumption is not likely to play an important role in the results.
20For evidence on the behavior of wages during temporary and permanent separations see Phipps, et al.
(2001), Albrecht, et al. (1999), and Wood, et al. (1993).
21For instance, a is such that when an individual with human capital h(jE;jG;jS) works, next period
human capital is h0 = h(jE;jG;jS) with probability 3=4 and h0 = h(jE;jG + 1;jS + 1) with probability
1=4:
16choose " = 0:9 which generates a vacancy cost over output close to 2% and an average cost
of hiring a worker of 2.5% the output per worker.22
Table 1 summarizes the parameter values that are selected without solving the model.
Table 1: Parameters Calibrated without Solving the Model
Parameter Value
b  { time preference 0.99
 { probability of dying 0.0056
 { probability of becoming non-fertile 0.007
 { time cost of children 0.10
" { bargaining power of workers 0.90
 { matching technology 0.40
Distribution across education:
Edu1 (HS or less) 0.4
Edu2 (Dropout) 0.3
Edu3 (College) 0.3
Relative human capital by education:
Edu1 (HS or less) 1.0
Edu2 (Dropout) 1.3
Edu3 (College) 2.2
2.5.2 Calibration of Other Parameters
The remaining parameter values are selected by solving the model. We compute statistics
from the model to compare with data targets. Then the parameter values are selected so
that the model statistics match the data targets. There are 12 parameter values that need to
be selected in this step: exogenous job destruction , preference parameter for the number
of children , goods cost of children  , fertility opportunities (1) and (4), the mean and
the standard deviation of fertility-home shock (;), the cost of posting a vacancy c, the
cost of keeping a match C, the parameter k in the matching technology, and the exogenous
gender and family productivity gaps (!g; !f).23 The values of these parameters are chosen so
22This hiring cost is consistent with the available empirical evidence, see for instance the discussion of this
evidence in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008).
23In the computations we restrict the maximum number of children that a female can have to six; however,
we do not think that this is a severe restriction since the fraction of women with more than six children in
17that the the model reproduces the targets for 12 statistics as described in Table 2. Finding
an equilibrium in the model involves nding a non-employment to vacancy ratio so that the
value of a vacancy is equal to zero. We solve for an equilibrium and the calibration at the
same time. As a result, our procedure involves solving numerically a system of 13 variables
to match 13 targets: 12 calibration targets and the equilibrium zero-prot condition for
vacancies.
Table 2: Parameters Calibrated by Solving the Model and Data Targets
Parameter Value Target Value
 0.13 Employment-to-population ratio of males 0.86
 1.26 Fertility rate 2.1
c 0.16 Probability of matching a vacancy 0.87
C 0.20 Mothers of 3-month-old child on leave 0.08
 0.66 Employment-to-population ratio of fertile females 0.66
 1.92 Employment-to-population ratio of mothers with infants 0.45
  0.24 Fertility rate of females with low education 2.46
(1) 0.05 Fraction of age-40-women childless 19.0
(4) 0.025 Fraction of age-40-women with 3 children 18.2
!g 0.12 Gender wage gap 0.19
!f 0.046 Family wage gap 0.11
k 0.77 Probability of nding a job 0.66
We now discuss some of the choices of data targets. We target an aggregate fertility rate
of 2.1. According to data from the U.S. Census reported by Bachu and O'Connell (2000),
women with an educational attainment of a high school degree or less have a fertility rate
of 2.46 children which we use as another target.24 We target a ratio of unemployment to
vacancies of 1.32. Once this target is matched, and as our discussion of the calibration
of k shows, the targets for p = 0:66 and q = 0:87 are automatically matched. Blau and
the data is less than 0.3 percent. Also, to economize in parameters, we restrict fertility opportunities  so
that the rst three components associated with the rst three children take a common value and so do the
last three components. We thus need to nd two parameter values for .
24The calibrated values for the goods and time cost of children,   and , generate an aggregate cost of
children relative to output of 16 percent in the model. According to Haveman and Wolfe (1995), the cost of
children relative to GDP in the U.S. economy is around 10 percent. Since the model abstracts from physical
capital, using a capital income share of 0:36, we calculate the cost of children relative to labor income to be
around 15.4 percent in the data, which is close to the 16 percent implied by the model.
18Kahn (2000) report a gender wage ratio of 0.81 when adjusting for age, education, and
experience dierences between individuals in the sample. Waldfogel (1998a) reports that
after controlling for age, education, experience, year, and individual xed eects, on average,
a child reduces women's wages by 4.6 percent. As a result we target a family wage gap of
0.11. Because there is an important time trend in the employment of women, the aggregate
employment-to-population ratios of older women tend to be lower than those of women of
recent cohorts. Because our model abstracts from this time trend, we choose a target of
employment of younger women which is less subject to a time trend. Using U.S. Census
data, Bachu and O'Connell (2000) report an employment-to-population ratio of women aged
25 to 44 of 0.66. We choose this number to be our target for the employment-to-population
ratio of fertile females. Our calibration also targets the employment-to-population ratio of
mothers with infants, and the fraction of mothers with 3-month-old children who are on
leave. By targeting the labor market behavior of women after childbirth, our calibration
emphasizes the importance of matching female labor turnover associated with childbirth.
The target statistics are obtained from Klerman and Leibowitz (1994) who use data from
the Current Population Survey and supplements for recent mothers. These authors report
an employment-to-population ratio of mothers with infants of 45 percent and a fraction of
8.2 percent of mothers with 3-month-old children who are on leave.
2.6 Properties of the Benchmark Economy
In this section, we show that the calibrated economy is consistent with U.S. data on a number
of key dimensions. We view this as a successful rst step in building a quantitative theory
of labor-market and fertility decisions in the U.S. economy. We discuss some key statistics
of the benchmark economy in order to help the reader understand how it behaves.
2.6.1 Calibration Results
Table 3 compares the results of the benchmark economy with U.S. data along the targets
specied in the calibration section. The model matches very closely the targets for male and
female employment, leaves, fertility, and wage gaps. In particular, the model matches almost
19exactly the targets for employment-to-population ratios of fertile females and mothers with
infants together with the target for the fraction of women of 3-month-old children who are
on leave. Fertility has an important impact on female employment, both in our model and
in the data. While 66 percent of fertile females are employed, the employment-to-population
ratio of mothers with infants is only 45 percent. These observations suggest that the model
economy is generating plausible amounts of labor-market turnover due to fertility decisions.
Table 3: Calibration Results: Targets
Target Data Model
Employment-to-population ratio of males 0.86 0.85
Fertility rate 2.1 2.1
Probability of matching a vacancy (q) 0.87 0.81
Mothers with 3-month-old children on leave 0.08 0.08
Employment-to-population ratio of fertile females 0.66 0.66
Employment-to-population ratio mothers with infants 0.45 0.44
Fertility rate of females with low education 2.46 2.43
Fraction of age-40-women childless 19.0 19.7
Fraction of age-40-women with 3 children 18.2 17.7
Gender wage gap 0.19 0.19
Family wage gap 0.11 0.11
Probability of nding a job (p) 0.66 0.70
Empirical evidence establishes a close connection between fertility and labor turnover,
for instance, Phipps, et al. (2001) document that 90% of career interruptions of women
are related to childbirth. It is thus important that the benchmark economy not only gen-
erates fertility rates that are consistent with the data, but also that it delivers a plausible
distribution of children across females. Table 4 reports the distribution of children across
women between 40 and 44 years of age in the U.S. data (see Bachu and O'Connell, 2000)
with the distribution of children across non-fertile females in the benchmark economy (e.g.,
women that have completed their fertility stage). The model is able to generate a reasonable
distribution of number of children across females.25
25While the model was calibrated to an aggregate fertility rate of 2.1, the data in the rst column of Table
4 imply an average of 1.8 children per woman. Therefore, we could not ask the model to reproduce these two
20Table 4: Distribution of Number of Children across Women
Data Model
No child 19.0 19.7
One child 17.3 16.7
Two children 35.8 25.6
Three children 18.2 17.7
4 children or more 9.6 20.3
Note: The column Data refers to women 40-
44 years of age and Model refers to non-fertile
females
2.6.2 Other Implications
We explore implications of the theory in dimensions which were not targeted in the calibra-
tion.
Employment, Fertility, and Labor Turnover by Education Employment levels in-
crease and fertility rates decrease with the level of education both in the model and the data.
The pattern between fertility and employment by education groups is broadly captured by
the model, although the model generates larger dierences in employment across education
groups than in the data (see Table 5).
Table 5: Fertility and Fertile Females Employment
Edu1 Edu2 Edu3
Fertility Rate:
Model 2.43 2.24 1.54
Data 2.5 2.0 1.7
Employment-to-Population Ratio:
Model 0.49 0.72 0.84
Data 0.59 0.69 0.74
observations exactly. We note that fertility rates in the U.S. are not constant over time, thus, it should not
be surprising that the mean of the distribution of children among 40-44 year-old women does not coincide
with the target for the fertility rate in the data.
21The dierence between employment of fertile females and employment of mothers with
infants provides a measure of the impact of fertility decisions on employment. Table 6
shows that fertility has a negative impact on the employment of females for all educational
groups. The reduction in employment is large for females with lower education levels. These
implications of the model are broadly consistent with data.26
Table 6: Employment and Labor-Market Decisions of Females
Edu1 Edu2 Edu3
Employment-to-Population:
Fertile Females 0.49 0.72 0.84
Mothers with Infants 0.26 0.48 0.77
Labor-Market Decisions of
Females Giving Birth: (fraction)
Accept 0.22 0.34 0.73
Reject 0.73 0.51 0.10
Leave 0.05 0.15 0.17
Another way to evaluate the impact of fertility on labor-market decisions is to consider
the labor-market decisions of females giving birth. These decisions dier systematically
across education groups. Whereas the percentage of women who reject a job after giving
birth is 73% for low education women, this percentage is only 10% for females with high
education (see Table 6).27
Wage Gaps by Education The gender and family wage ratios in the model are 0.81 and
0.89 as targeted in the calibration procedure.28 Gender and family wage ratios in the model
26Using panel data from the NLSY, Erosa et al. (2009b) report that the employment ratio of mothers
with children less than 3 months old is 0.29 for non-college vs. 0.48 for college women. Employment ratios
increase with the age of the youngest child so mothers with the youngest child between 1 to 5 years old have
employment ratios of 0.54 for non-college and 0.69 for college women.
27Note that in all educational categories there is a non-negligible fraction of females taking leaves of at
least one period even though leaves are costly for them. Females on leave make on average a side payment to
their employer (receive a negative wage) so that the match is not broken while they enjoy the value of staying
at home with their children. The average wage among females on leave relative to the average female wage is
-0.26, -0.21, and -0.13 in each education group. While negative wages do not occur in practice, we think that
the environment where leaves are ecient is a useful benchmark to assess the impact of mandatory leaves.
28We dene the gender wage ratio as the average wages of females relative males and the family wage
ratio as the average wages of females with children relative to females without children. Since people in
22dier across education groups because fertility and labor market decisions vary with the
level of education. Table 7 shows that the gender and family wage ratios are lower for less
educated females, though the dierences are not quantitatively large. This result is broadly
consistent with data.29
To understand how human capital accumulation aects wage ratios in our model, we
isolate the contribution of the exogenous components of wage dierences. We approximate
the exogenous gender ratio by (1   !g)(1    n!f) and the exogenous family wage ratio by
(1    n!f), where  n is the fertility rate of the relevant educational group. In aggregate, the
gender wage ratio is 0.81 while the related exogenous ratio is 0.80. In turn, the family wage
ratio is 0.89 and the exogenous family ratio is 0.90. As a result, the exogenous productivity
factors in the model account for most of the dierences in wages across gender and family
status. Specic human capital accounts for less than 10 percent of the family wage gap in
the model (1 percentage point out of 11). The quantitative importance of tenure capital in
explaining wage gaps is mitigated by the endogeneity of fertility and labor market decisions
in the model. If tenure capital were substantial, females would nd it optimal not to destroy
job matches and perhaps even not to have children. In other words, in the model non-working
mothers are systematically selected from the group of females with low tenure capital, and
thus permanent separations have a small impact on human capital.30 This selection eect
is particularly strong for females of low education, who are rarely at work relative to the
same group of males (the employment-to-population ratio is 0.49 for females and 0.84 for
males). Since the females working are self-selected among the ones with high tenure capital,
our model dier in the level of education and experience, we compute gender and family ratios within each
education and experience level. We then use the distribution of experience to construct a weighted average
of gender and family ratios for each education level and the distribution of education in order to construct
an aggregate gender and family ratio that controls for dierences in education and experience across genders
and family status. As a result, these statistics are readily comparable with those reported in the empirical
literature (see, for instance, Blau and Kahn 1997 and 2000).
29Erosa et al. (2009b) report that the average gender wage ratio is 0.77 for non-college and 0.80 for college
women between 20 and 40 years of age. Other authors have documented the negative impact of the number
of children on wage ratios and since women with less education have more children this is consistent with
the increase in the family wage ratio for more educated females in the model.
30This result is consistent with the ndings in Erosa, et al. (2002) using a more elaborate decision-theoretic
model of job transitions but that abstracts from the demand side of the labor market and from temporary
separations.
23Table 7: Gender and Family Wage Ratios by Education
Fertile Females
All Edu1 Edu2 Edu3
Gender Wage Ratio:
Model 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.82
Exogenous 0.80 0.78 0.79 0.82
Family Wage Ratio:
Model 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.91
Exogenous 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.93
the gender wage ratio is higher than the exogenous wage ratio for the low education group
(.81 versus .78). The selection eect is small for females of high education as they have
similar employment ratios as males, which explains why the gender wage ratio is equal to
the exogenous gender wage ratio for this group of females.
3 Mandatory Leaves
In this section, we consider an economy with an institutional arrangement that entitles
females to take maternity leave after giving birth. The objective is to study the aggregate
and distributional impact of mandatory parental leaves on outcomes.
3.1 The Economy with Mandatory Leaves
We assume that females are entitled to take a leave of  e periods after giving birth. Since
we consider experiments where mandatory leaves are unpaid as well as paid, we keep the
notation as general as possible. Mandatory paid leaves are nanced through a proportional
tax, collected on the labor income of all employed workers regardless of gender. Females
on leave receive a benet equal to a fraction  of the last wage (when leaves are unpaid we
set  = 0, and the tax rate on labor income  = 0). Mandatory leave policies in O.E.C.D.
24countries resemble the institutional arrangement just described.31
We assume that females can only collect benets when they are attached to a job. In
particular, a female cannot reject a job oer and collect benets. The decision problem of a
fertile female in this setting involves a new state variable e, denoting the number of periods
of leave a female is entitled to. When a female gives birth, e is set at  e, the maximum
number of periods of leave entitlements prescribed by the law. If the female takes a leave,
next period e is set at e0 = maxfe   1;0g. If she does not take a leave, e is set at 0 (for
convenience we denote this state as e0).
We do not rule out the possibility of voluntary leaves. That is, females can negotiate
with their employer, period by period, for a longer leave than the one guaranteed by the law.
When a female is not entitled to take a mandatory leave (e = e0), the functions dening
the value of accept A, leave L, and reject R are the same as the ones described under the
voluntary leaves arrangement. The same applies to the value of a job and the bargaining
equation dening wages when working and on a (voluntary) leave. When a female is entitled
to a leave, the equation dening the wage of a mandatory paid leave is given by
w
f
l (d;h;n;;e) =  w
f(d0;h;n   1;;e0):
The above recursive representation of the benet of a paid leave has the advantage that we
do not need to carry as a state variable the last wage received before taking a leave. We
approximate this wage by the wage paid to a female in state (d0;h;n 1;;e0). The implicit
assumptions are that the last time (or period) the female was working she had n 1 children,
could not enjoy the value of staying at home with a child d = d0, and had no entitlements.32
31Ruhm (1998, Table 1, page 297) reports the institutional arrangement of mandatory leaves for a set of
European countries. The entitlements in Europe are nanced through general payroll taxes imposed by the
Government, with replacement wage rates that go from 60 percent in Greece to 100 percent in Germany,
and duration ranging from 14 weeks in Ireland to 64 weeks in Sweden. The mandatory entitlement in the
U.S. since 1993 allows for 12 weeks of unpaid leave.
32Note that the above formula is an approximation (although a fairly accurate one in most cases) because
it may occur that a female has two children without coming back to work while keeping the job match. Also,
it may happen that the human capital may have changed after the last time a female worked. It is also
worth emphasizing that because d = d0 the benet of a paid leave is independent of the current realization
of v.
25We allow for the possibility of side payments between the employer and the worker
so that they both agree on whether to work, temporarily separate, or break the match. In
particular, if the surplus is maximized when the match is destroyed, the rm will compensate
the female for rejecting the job and losing the benet entitlements. The bargaining equation
determining the side payment, which we denote as wr, satises




where we use the compact notation s = (d;h;n;;e) to denote the state of the worker. When
a female is entitled to a leave, the threat point is given by the value of a leave (which is
higher than the value of reject). If the worker takes a leave, the value of a job for the rm
is equal to Jl. If Jl is too negative, the employer may be willing to pay wr to the worker so
that the female rejects and obtains R + wr > L, while the employer obtains  wr >  Jl(s).











which can be negative. Since employers are forward looking, they take this possibility into
account when negotiating wages with fertile females. It is also worth noting that if the
surplus is maximized, when a female decides to work, and the worker is entitled to a leave,
then the employer pays the worker a wage in order to induce the female to work. In this
case, the threat point of the worker is given by the value of taking a leave since, in this state,








The previous discussion makes it clear that bargaining, together with the possibility of
side payments, implies that the surplus of a match is always maximized. However, mandatory
paid leaves may not be ecient from the viewpoint of a society. When leaves are centrally
nanced through tax revenues from the government, the benets paid to females on leave
26may subsidize inecient matches. To put it simply, a match that would be destroyed in the
absence of leave entitlements may not be destroyed because the worker may require a large
side payment wr in order to give up the leave entitlement.
3.2 Quantitative Experiments
We evaluate the eects of a 1-period unpaid parental leave policy which corresponds to the
institutional arrangement in the U.S. after the passage of the 1993 F.M.L.A. and \European-
style" parental leave policies involving 1 and 2 periods of fully-paid leaves (e.g., leaves that
pay 100 percent of the wage). We also report the eects of long (up to a year) unpaid and
paid leaves since several countries, such as Canada, have recently moved to leave entitlements
of this long duration.
3.2.1 Main Findings
Welfare We compute the welfare eects of mandatory leave policies as the amount of
consumption required by a newborn individual to be indierent between living a lifetime in
the benchmark economy and in the mandatory-leaves economy being considered. Note that
we compute a constant annual consumption compensation (expressed in terms of per capita
GDP) which is applied for 45 years (45  4 periods). The results are reported in Table 8
by gender and education groups. Parental-leave policies lead to aggregate welfare losses.
This should not be surprising as these policies distort the decision of keeping vs. destroying
a match and the decision of whether to work or take a leave. The welfare eects dier
substantially across gender and educational categories. The welfare of males falls because
males pay taxes and face a lower job nding rate without beneting from leave policies. The
welfare gains of highly educated females are smaller than the welfare gains of less educated
females. Females gain substantially with generous policies, but this benet occurs at the
expense of a reduction in the welfare of males. The fact that parental-leave policies have
sizeable welfare-eects of opposite sign across genders suggests that these policies should
27aect resource allocation within the household.33
Table 8: Welfare by Gender and Education
Females Males
Agg. Edu1 Edu2 Edu3 Agg. Edu1 Edu2 Edu3
Unpaid 1 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.05 -0.08 -0.06 -0.07 -0.12
Paid 1 0.15 0.22 0.22 -0.01 -0.50 -0.34 -0.45 -0.76
Paid 2 0.25 0.40 0.39 -0.07 -0.81 -0.56 -0.72 -1.22
Paid 4 0.33 0.58 0.54 -0.20 -1.28 -0.88 -1.15 -1.94
Note: The numbers reported refer to annual consumption compensation for 45 years
and are expressed as percentage of annual per-capita GDP of the benchmark economy.
Fertility Rates Mandatory leave entitlements have an impact on fertility rates. This
result questions the often-used assumption in the empirical wage literature on the exogeneity
of fertility rates. Compared to the benchmark economy, mandatory leave policies increase
fertility in aggregate as well as by education groups (see Table 9). One exception is the
fertility rate of females in the lowest education group with a 4-period paid leave which is
roughly the same as in the benchmark economy. Interestingly, for this group of females
with leave policies, the fertility rate decreases with the generosity of leave entitlements. To
understand this result, we note that mandatory leaves have two opposing eects on fertility
rates. First, they reduce the cost of taking a leave borne by the worker which positively aects
fertility of workers who are matched with a job. Second, mandatory leave policies encourage
unmatched workers to postpone fertility decisions until they are matched with a rm, thereby
reducing the fertility of non-employed workers. This eect is particularly important for
females in the lowest education group since this group has the lowest employment rate.34
Labor Market Decisions of Females Giving Birth Mandatory leaves reduce the pro-
portion of females giving birth who reject jobs and increase the proportion taking leaves.
33Extending this framework to model household decisions is a non-trivial task that we leave for future
research.
34The fraction of unmatched fertile females that give birth decreases from 2.7 in the benchmark economy
to 2.6 in the economy with 4-period paid leaves.
28Table 9: Fertility Rates by Education
Aggregate Edu1 Edu2 Edu3
Benchmark 2.11 2.43 2.24 1.54
Unpaid 1 2.14 2.47 2.27 1.55
Paid 1 2.18 2.46 2.30 1.69
Paid 2 2.20 2.45 2.32 1.76
Paid 4 2.23 2.43 2.33 1.85
Interestingly, these eects are much stronger when leaves are paid. Whereas in the economy
with 1 period unpaid leaves (Unpaid 1) 22% of females giving birth decide to take a leave
and 39% reject a job, in the economy with 1 period paid leaves (Paid 1) 85% of mothers
take leaves and there are no mothers rejecting jobs (see Table 10). The percentage of fe-
males giving birth taking leaves increases to 92% and to 96% when the length of paid leaves
increases to 2 and 4 periods.
Table 10: Labor-Market Decisions of Females Giving Birth
(fraction)
Accept Reject Leave
Benchmark 0.38 0.51 0.11
Unpaid 1 0.39 0.39 0.22
Paid 1 0.15 0.00 0.85
Paid 2 0.08 0.00 0.92
Paid 4 0.04 0.00 0.96
Employment vs. Work Parental-leave policies introduce a distinction between employ-
ment and work since these policies encourage females to take leaves. This distinction may
be relevant for wages of females if more work leads to more human capital accumulation on
the job (see Erosa, et al. (2009b) for a quantitative assessment of this channel in the U.S.
economy). Therefore, it is of interest to quantify the impact of mandatory leave policies on
the working decision of females. Table 11 shows the working and employment-to-population
ratios for fertile females and for mothers with infants. Whereas in the benchmark econ-
29omy 44% of mothers with infants are employed and 41% are working, in the economy with
six-months-paid mandatory leaves (Paid 2), 71% of mothers with infants are employed, and
only 22% are working. Hence, mandatory leaves increase the employment of mothers with
infants because of greater leave taking. Overall, we nd that the employment rate of fertile
females is not aected much by parental leave policies. This nding implies that the job re-
instatement guarantee associated with these policies does not play an important role, which
follows from the fact that the job nding rate in our baseline economy is quite high (70%
per period).35
Table 11: Ratios of Employment and Working to Population (%)
Fertile Females Mothers with Infants
Employment Working Employment Working
Benchmark 66.4 66.0 44.1 40.7
Unpaid 1 66.0 65.3 47.8 41.3
Paid 1 66.6 63.0 64.4 29.5
Paid 2 66.4 61.0 70.6 21.6
Paid 4 66.6 58.6 76.1 13.2
Note: Employment includes all matched individuals (working and on leave),
whereas Working excludes those on leave.
3.2.2 Understanding the Relative Importance of Bargaining, General Equilib-
rium, and Redistribution Channels
In the model, parental leave policies aect equilibrium allocations through the bargaining,
general equilibrium, and redistributive channels. To evaluate the relative importance of these
channels we compare equilibrium allocations and welfare between the benchmark economy
and economies with parental leave policies. To isolate the general equilibrium eect, we
simulate an economy with a parental leave policy keeping xed the job nding rate of the
35Mandatory leave policies have a small impact on the employment of males because these policies have a
small eect on the decision of rms to post vacancies. This result is explained by the low tax rate needed to
nance parental leaves. For instance, the tax rate on labor income in the economy with 2-period paid leave
is equal to 1.37 percent.
30benchmark economy. We also simulate the eects of policies when there is no redistribution
across gender and education types. To eliminate the redistribution eect across genders,
we assume that parental leaves are nanced with taxes on female workers. To eliminate
the redistribution eect across education groups, we assume that the tax rate to nance
parental leaves varies across education categories, ensuring that for each education group
the aggregate tax revenue is equal to aggregate benets collected. The bargaining channel
can be assessed by examining the eects of the policy once the redistribution and general
equilibrium eects have been eliminated. The results of these experiments are summarized
in Table 12 for an economy with 4 periods paid leaves.36 We nd that the eect of paid
parental leave policies on welfare of females is determined by the important contribution of
all three channels. However, the eect of these policies on fertility and employment is mainly
driven by the bargaining channel.
If the job nding rate (p) is xed at the value in the baseline economy, the welfare gain
(permanent consumption compensation) of a 4-period paid leave increases from 0:33% to
0:58% of GDP (compare columns 2 and 3 in Table 12). Thus, the general equilibrium channel
has important eects on welfare. When the redistributive eects of the policy are eliminated,
the welfare gain of a newborn female decreases from 0:58% to  0:34% of GDP (compare
columns 3 and 4 in Table 12). Hence, the redistributive channel generates an increase in
welfare of 0:92% of GDP. The bargaining channel is assessed by examining the eects of the
policy once the redistribution and general equilibrium eects have been eliminated, and it
accounts for a reduction in welfare of 0:34% of GDP. That the bargaining channel implies
a reduction in welfare may seem surprising at rst glance. Since parental leave policies
increase the threat point of females, we may expect that the bargaining channel should
increase welfare of females. However, parental leaves have an additional eect on bargaining
outcomes { by subsidizing leave taking these policies reduce the surplus of a match which
negatively aects the welfare of females.
To better assess the importance of these two eects {changes in threat point and surplus of
36For ease of exposition, the table reports results aggregated across education types. For the welfare eects
of parental leave policies of length other than 4 periods, see Erosa et al. (2009a).
31Table 12: Decomposition of Eects of a 4-Period Paid Leave
No Redist.
Benchmark Paid 4 p = 0:7 and p = 0:7
Welfare of Females (% of GDP) { 0.33 0.58 -0.34
Employment of Mothers
with Infants 0.44 0.76 0.76 0.76
Employment Fertile Females 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.64
% of Population on Leave 0.11 2.40 2.42 2.42
Fertility 2.11 2.23 2.23 2.26
Cost of Leaves/GDP 0.02 0.36 0.36 0.36
Note: The third column is an economy with no general equilibrium eects while the fourth
column is an economy with no general equilibrium and no redistribution eects.
matches{ on bargaining outcomes, Table 13 compares economies that dier on the generosity
of parental leave policies. Each of these economies abstracts from general equilibrium and
redistribution eects. Welfare of females is higher in the economy with 1-period unpaid
leaves than in the benchmark economy, a result that follows from the higher threat point
of females with the mandated leave. However, more generous leave policies imply lower
aggregate welfare of females due to the bargaining channel, a result that follows from the
decrease in the surplus of matches associated to leaves of long duration. Notice that paid
mandatory leave policies of long duration impose important costs on rms { the aggregate
cost of leaves in the economy with 4-period paid leaves is 0:36% of GDP. In anticipation of
these costs, rms and females negotiate a reduction on the wage paid to females with no
children { the wage of a newborn female with no children is on average (across all possible
human capital levels) 2% lower than in the benchmark economy.
The discussion above underscores that parental leave policies redistribute resources across
females with dierent number of children. To assess this eect, we simulate the economy to
compute discounted lifetime utility for a cohort of females. We then compare the average
ex-post utility for various groups of females according to the number of the children they
bear during their lifetime. We perform these computations for the benchmark economy and
for the economy with a 4-period paid mandatory leave. We nd that this policy induces
32an important redistribution of resources across females with dierent number of children.
Whereas females with 0 and 1 children face welfare losses of 0:7% and 0:2%, females with 2
or more children exhibit a welfare gain of 0:9% of GDP.37
Table 13: Eects of the Bargaining Channel
Benchmark Unpaid 1 Paid 1 Paid 2 Paid 4
Welfare of Females (% of GDP) { 0.04 -0.17 -0.20 -0.34
Employment of Mothers
with Infants 0.44 0.47 0.65 0.71 0.76
Cost of Leaves/GDP 0.02 0.03 0.16 0.24 0.36
Wage of Newborn Female
(% change) { -0.38 -0.51 -1.04 -1.83
Note: All the policy experiments assume p = 0:7 and no redistribution across types so the eect
of changes in bargaining is isolated.
Our results also reveal that the eects of parental leave policies on fertility, leave taking
decisions, and employment of mothers with infants are mostly driven by the bargaining
channel and not the general equilibrium or redistribution channels. Changes in the threat
point of females giving birth drive the impact of parental leave policies on fertility and leave
taking behavior.38 Young females anticipate that there are some states in the future in which
their threat point in bargaining will be higher and because the realization of these states
depend on the decisions of females to give birth and take a leave, the change in the threat
point induced by the policy eectively subsidizes fertility and leave taking.
3.2.3 Parental Leave Policies vs. Other Subsidies to Mothers
We compare parental leave policies with two other policies that also subsidize females with
young children. We assume that fertile females receive a xed subsidy amount per child that
37We do not report welfare for females with only 2 children as the size of this group and their average
human capital change quite signicantly across steady states, making ex-post welfare comparisons dicult.
Since the measures of females with 0, 1, and 2 or more children do not vary much across steady states, we
aggregate results for these groups of females.
38While these statistics vary substantially with the generosity of parental leaves (see Table 13) , they vary
little with the job nding rate -general equilibrium- and when the redistributive channel is shut down (see
Table 12)
33is either contingent on the decision to work or the decision to stay at home. The subsidy
is nanced by a tax on labor earnings of all individuals in the economy and is set equal to
the tax in the 2-period paid leave economy (Paid 2). The amount of the subsidy per child is
determined so that in equilibrium the government budget is balanced.
Table 14: Comparing 2-Period Paid Leaves with Other Subsidies to Mothers
Benchmark Paid 2 Work-Subsidy Home-Subsidy
Employment of Fertile Females 0.66 0.66 0.76 0.56
Employment of Mothers
with Infants 0.44 0.70 0.50 0.38
Fertility 2.11 2.20 2.15 2.20
Welfare of Females (% of GDP) { 0.25 0.78 -0.26
Welfare of Males (% of GDP) { -0.81 -0.07 -1.36
Job Finding Rate (p) 0.70 0.69 0.75 0.65
Table 14 summarizes our results. We nd that the employment of fertile females varies
substantially across the economies considered. While the employment of fertile female in-
creases from 66% in the benchmark economy to 76% in the economy with work-subsidies,
it is not aected by a 2 period paid parental leave. However, the parental leave policy has
a much stronger eect on the employment of mothers with infants { an increase of 26 per-
centage points with parental leaves and an increase of only 6 percentage points with work
subsidies. The subsidy to stay at home reduces both the employment of fertile females and
of mothers with infants. While the fertility rate increases with the three policies considered,
the increase is much lower in the case of the policy that subsidizes work. Regarding welfare,
it is interesting that the policy that subsidizes working mothers leads to the biggest welfare
gains for females and the smallest welfare losses for males across the three policies consid-
ered. The policy that impacts more negatively on the welfare of both males and females is
the one that subsidizes staying at home. Unlike parental leave policies, work subsidies are
not costly for the rm. Working subsidies lead rms to post more vacancies, increasing the
job nding rate from .7 in the baseline economy to .75 and hence, improving the welfare of
34all agents in the economy.39
Proponents of mandatory leaves argue that these policies can benet the health of children
by facilitating breast feeding and by enhancing cognitive development.40 Table 15 reveals
that the policies that subsidize either working mothers or mothers who stay at home have
very little impact on the time that mothers spent at home after giving birth. This stands in
contrast to the paid leave policy which reduces the fraction of mothers that stay less than 1
period at home with their children from 30% in the benchmark economy to 7% and increases
the fraction of mothers that stay 2 periods with their children from 10% in the benchmark
economy to 66%.




Benchmark 30 17 10
Paid 2 7 13 66
Work-Subsidy 32 19 11
Home-Subsidy 27 16 9
4 Conclusions
We built a general equilibrium theory of labor-market and fertility decisions to study the
economic impact of two alternative institutional arrangements for temporary job separations:
voluntary and mandatory leaves. We used this theory to quantify the impact of mandatory
leave entitlements on outcomes. We found that mandatory-leave policies lead to substantial
redistributions across people in terms of steady-state welfare and lead to changes in fertility
and employment ratios. Parental leave policies lead to aggregate steady-state welfare losses
39In Erosa et al. (2009a) we discuss the eects of these subsidies on human capital accumulation.
40See for instance Ruhm (2000) and the references therein. Ruhm (2000) nds some empirical support for
a positive impact of parental-leave policies on children's health in Europe { a 10 week extension of mandatory
leaves decreases infant mortality between 1 and 2 percent.
35because these policies subsidize inecient matches and encourage too much leave taking by
fertile females.
These ndings should be interpreted in the context of our model where rms and employ-
ees can eciently negotiate voluntary leaves. To match the low fraction of women taking
parental leaves in the U.S. prior to the passage of the FMLA, our calibration implies that
the cost of leave entitlements should be high relative to the benets. In practice, it may
be that market imperfections such as asymmetric information or contracting problems limit
the ability of market forces in the United States to provide voluntary leaves. As a result,
government regulation may play a role in increasing the surplus in job matches and mitigat-
ing human capital losses by females that permanently break job matches in order to spend
time at home with children. Moreover, there is some empirical evidence that parental leaves
improve pediatric health.41 This may provide a rationale for parental leave policies if parents
discount the future more heavily than socially optimal (because of borrowing constraints), if
parents only pay a fraction of health costs (which are partly covered by medical insurance),
or if parents ignore some negative health externalities imposed on other children.
Our work can be extended in a number of dimensions. Private information on preferences
towards family leaves may lead to an under-provision of parental leaves; therefore, it would be
relevant to consider a framework with asymmetric information about individual's preferences
regarding the value of time spent with children, and how this positive role for parental leave
policies interact with the negative eects in the labor market. Our framework is also suitable
for studying parental leave policies in conjunction with other labor-market institutions that
may aect female labor supply such as the availability of part-time jobs, child-care policies,
ring costs and other employment protection policies. We leave these important extensions
of the model for future research.
41See for instance Ruhm (2000).
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